Why the carriers may have a defence

By Eamonn Ryan

The Competition Commission’s recent referral of an alleged decade-long price-fixing cartel among the local units of Maersk, CMA CGM, MSC, Evergreen, PIL, MOL, Cosco and K Line arrives at a critical time for the cold chain: shipping rates have a direct influence on margins throughout the refrigerated supply chain, and any proven collusion would imply exporters have been unknowingly carrying inflated logistics costs for years. This is part two of a two-part series.

…continued from part one.

However, identical or simultaneous GRIs are not unusual in global liner shipping, and the carriers may offer several legitimate economic and operational explanations.

1. GRIs are a standard, public pricing mechanism

Carriers frequently publish GRIs well in advance. When cost drivers – fuel, terminal charges, currency movements – affect all carriers equally, they often announce similar adjustments. This is not inherently collusion.

2. The 2008–2018 period was marked by industry-wide shocks

The decade saw:

• the global financial crisis
• prolonged periods of overcapacity
• volatile bunker fuel prices
• weak freight rates

These systemic pressures often lead to industry-wide rate resets, producing parallel pricing even without communication.

3. Alliances and vessel-sharing agreements (VSAs)

Most major carriers operate through alliances, sharing ships, schedules and slots. This operational integration often requires some alignment of tariffs and surcharges to avoid anomalies on shared services. OECD and ITF studies have repeatedly found that operational coordination in alliances can give the appearance of synchronised pricing without necessarily crossing into illegal territory.

4. Competition law recognises that parallel conduct is not illegal

Unless the Commission produces non-public evidence – internal emails, meetings or explicit agreements – the carriers can argue that what the Commission sees as collusion was simply rational, independent behaviour within a high-fixed-cost, cyclical industry.

 

What this means for SA’s cold chain

Regardless of the legal outcome, the case carries major implications for the refrigerated logistics ecosystem.

If the Commission succeeds:

• Freight rates may stabilise or even fall, helping exporters of citrus, avocados, table grapes, meat and chilled products
• Cold stores and packhouses could recover margin, especially during peak seasons when every dollar on freight counts
• Importers of pharmaceuticals, frozen goods and temperature-sensitive ingredients may see cost relief
• The case may usher in greater scrutiny of port and maritime pricing, benefiting a sector already struggling with port inefficiencies and high handling costs

If the carriers successfully defend the case:

• The ruling may affirm that parallel pricing in global shipping is not per se suspicious, providing predictability for shipping lines operating in South Africa
• Cold chain players may need to accept that freight volatility is structural, driven by capacity cycles rather than by anti-competitive conduct
• The sector may instead focus on infrastructure reforms, such as port modernisation and cold storage investments, as the primary levers for reducing logistics costs

Conclusion: a high-stakes case for a vulnerable sector

The Commission’s referral places the global shipping industry under the sharpest scrutiny it has faced in South Africa since earlier automotive-shipping prosecutions. For the cold chain, the stakes are high: even small changes in freight pricing ripple across margins, export volumes and global competitiveness.

Whether the tribunal ultimately confirms collusion or accepts the carriers’ economic explanations, the case is likely to reshape transparency and pricing behaviour on the country’s most important refrigerated trade lanes. For South Africa’s cold chain – already under strain from port congestion, energy instability and global competition – the outcome could influence costs and competitiveness for years to come.

References

1. 2025. South Africa to prosecute Maersk, CMA units for price-fixing. By Ana Monteiro. 2 December.
2. Competition Commission of South Africa. 2012–2015. Media releases and annual reports on shipping and cargo cartel cases.
3. European Commission. 2000. Europe–Far East Price-Fixing Case. DG Competition, Brussels.
4. OECD / International Transport Forum. 2015. Liner Shipping Alliances and Competition Policy. Paris: OECD.
5. 2008–2018. Review of Maritime Transport. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
6. Drewry Maritime Research. 2008–2018. Liner Shipping Freight Rate Trends and Analysis. London: Drewry Shipping Consultants.
7. Motta, M. 2004. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press.

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