By Eamonn Ryan
The Competition Commission’s recent referral of an alleged decade-long price-fixing cartel among the local units of Maersk, CMA CGM, MSC, Evergreen, PIL, MOL, Cosco and K Line arrives at a critical time for the cold chain: shipping rates have a direct influence on margins throughout the refrigerated supply chain, and any proven collusion would imply exporters have been unknowingly carrying inflated logistics costs for years. This is part one of a two-part series.
South Africa’s cold chain relies heavily on predictable, competitively priced container shipping – particularly for citrus, frozen meat, dairy, pharmaceuticals and temperature-sensitive manufactured goods. Any change in pricing behaviour by major global carriers directly affects export competitiveness, the landed cost of imports, and ultimately the viability of cold storage operators, packhouses and logistics providers.
The Competition Commission’s recent referral of an alleged decade-long price-fixing cartel among the local units of Maersk, CMA CGM, MSC, Evergreen, PIL, MOL, Cosco and K Line therefore arrives at a critical time for the cold chain: shipping rates have a direct influence on margins throughout the refrigerated supply chain, and any proven collusion would imply exporters have been unknowingly carrying inflated logistics costs for years.
But while the allegations are serious, the case is not straightforward.
The core allegation
According to the Commission, the carriers fixed General Rate Increases (GRIs) on routes between South Africa and Asia, and between South Africa and West Africa, from 2008 to 2018. GRIs are standard industry tariff adjustments used to recalibrate pricing after periods of discounting, fuel shifts or capacity imbalance. The Commission alleges the increases were not independently determined but identical in amount and timing, and thus constituted a cartel in contravention of the Competition Act.
If proven, the Commission argues, dismantling the arrangement will reduce import costs, make exports more competitive and lower consumer prices – all critical for a cold chain sector already carrying tight margins and vulnerable to global rate volatility.
Why the commission may have a strong case
Competition prosecutions in shipping rely on more than parallel pricing. To prevail, the Commission must show co-ordination, not just similarity. Historically, successful cartel cases have hinged on clear evidence of communication, agreement or synchronised planning:
- South African precedent – automotive and cargo shipping cases
In earlier cases (particularly in 2012–2015), carriers such as NYK admitted to participation in restrictive practices on vehicle-transport routes. Fines were imposed after evidence emerged of direct communication and co-ordinated tender behaviour. These cases show that the Commission is experienced in dissecting shipping markets and willing to pursue global players.
- European precedent – Europe–Far East price-fixing (2000)
The European Commission previously fined several carriers for agreeing on freight rates and surcharges. The decisive factor was documented evidence of agreements rather than mere parallel conduct. The case remains one of the most cited examples of unlawful co-ordination in liner shipping.
- Identical increases across multiple, unrelated routes
If the Commission can demonstrate that carriers raised GRIs by precisely the same quantum at the same time – and did so across routes where operational collaboration does not logically force uniform pricing – the tribunal could interpret this as strong circumstantial evidence of a cartel.
If these elements are present, the prosecution may argue that refrigerated exporters, especially citrus, beef and frozen produce sectors, have suffered inflated logistics costs for years, weakening South Africa’s global competitiveness.
References:
- 2025. South Africa to prosecute Maersk, CMA units for price-fixing. By Ana Monteiro. 2 December.
- Competition Commission of South Africa. 2012–2015. Media releases and annual reports on shipping and cargo cartel cases.
- European Commission. 2000. Europe–Far East Price-Fixing Case. DG Competition, Brussels.
- OECD / International Transport Forum. 2015. Liner Shipping Alliances and Competition Policy. Paris: OECD.
- 2008–2018. Review of Maritime Transport. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
- Drewry Maritime Research. 2008–2018. Liner Shipping Freight Rate Trends and Analysis. London: Drewry Shipping Consultants.
- Motta, M. 2004. Competition Policy: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press.