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Home » The hidden costs of ‘Fitted For, But Not With’: Part 2

The hidden costs of ‘Fitted For, But Not With’: Part 2

By Eugene le Roux, FSAIRAC, and Eamonn Ryan

Navigating ambiguity in acquisition. This is Part 2 of a two-part series.

It is imperative that the decision and its detailed implications are explicitly described at the beginning of the contract.
It is imperative that the decision and its detailed implications are explicitly described at the beginning of the contract. Tirachardz/Freepik

…continued from Part 1.

For complex systems, Option C often presents the most pragmatic balance between cost and future readiness. It front-loads the critical engineering and planning, mitigating major risks without incurring the full production costs of Option D.

 

The interfacing conundrum: why late integration fails

The seemingly simple act of adding a subsystem later can have a massive interfacing effect on the rest of the vehicle. Consider an air conditioning unit:

  • Electrical: It demands power. Is the alternator sized to handle the additional load? Is the electrical harness robust enough, with sufficient spare capacity and correct routing, to carry the necessary current without overheating or interfering with other systems? An under-designed electrical system would require costly upgrades or even complete replacement of alternators and harnesses, potentially impacting other critical vehicle functions.
  • Thermal: An aircon unit generates heat. Is the engine cooling system designed to dissipate this additional thermal load? Without proper provision, the engine could overheat, compromising reliability and lifespan.
  • Packaging: The unit needs physical space. Is there sufficient room, considering vibration, maintenance access, and airflow?
  • Structural: Can the vehicle’s structure support the weight and vibration of the unit?
  • Software: Does the vehicle’s control system have the necessary interfaces and logic to manage the aircon?

Trying to integrate such a subsystem later, without comprehensive upfront design and qualification, is not only expensive and time-consuming but can also be impossible without fundamental redesigns of the core platform. Under-designed parts would either fail prematurely or require costly retrofits, negating any perceived initial savings.

 

Production, tooling and contractual clarity

If the subsystems are not produced upfront, the time required to do so later can be substantial. It’s not merely a matter of assembly; it involves setting up production lines, sourcing components, and ensuring quality control – processes that can take months or even years if not planned.

Managing the acquisition of expensive tooling for mass manufacturing, especially with uncertainty about future production, requires careful strategy. Options include:

  • Phased investment: Investing in tooling incrementally as demand solidifies.
  • Modular tooling: Designing tooling that can be adapted for various production volumes or even other products.
  • Risk-sharing agreements: Collaborating with suppliers to share the financial burden of tooling investment.

This scenario is, unfortunately, not uncommon in large acquisition programs. It often arises from a tension between immediate budget constraints and long-term strategic needs.

Crucially, regardless of the chosen option, it is imperative that the decision and its detailed implications are explicitly described at the beginning of the contract and Statement of Work (SOW). This clarity avoids ambiguity, sets realistic expectations and provides a clear roadmap for all parties involved, mitigating future disputes and ensuring successful programme execution. Failing to do so transforms a seemingly minor contractual phrase into a potential multi-million-dollar headache.